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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT NASHVILLE 
  
JACQUET MCWHERTER,      ) 
                     Employee, ) Docket No. 2015-06-0093 
 )  
v. )  
 )  
CENTURION STONE PRODUCTS, 
                     Employer, 
and 
 
 AMERISURE, 
                     Insurance Carrier. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
State File No. 16559-2015 
 
 
 
Judge Joshua Davis Baker 
 )  
 
COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER GRANTING 
 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
This matter came before the Court on July 24, 2017, upon the Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by Centurion Stone Products under Rule 56 of the Tennessee 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The determinative legal issue is whether Centurion is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law because Mr. McWherter did not suffer an injury 
in the course and scope of his employment.  Mr. McWherter did not file a response to 
Centurion’s Motion and did not attend the hearing.  The Court grants the Motion for 
Summary Judgment.  
 
History of Claim  
 
 Mr. McWherter alleged a tow motor ran over his right foot while working at 
Centurion.  Centurion initially provided medical treatment but later denied the claim.  Mr. 
McWherther then requested an expedited hearing seeking medical treatment and 
temporary disability benefits.  Following an evidentiary hearing, this Court denied Mr. 
McWherter’s request for temporary disability and medical benefits upon finding his 
testimony lacked credibility: 
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Here, Mr. McWherter was hesitant, evasive, defensive, and argumentative.  
He interrupted both defense counsel and witnesses and continually 
mumbled his responses in cross examination, directing defense counsel to 
“move on” when he did not want to answer.  Other times, his recalcitrant 
demeanor and unresponsiveness motivated defense counsel to move on 
voluntarily.  Many of Mr. McWherter’s answers were unreasonable, such 
as claiming to see a tire track on his foot and forgetting facts inconvenient 
to his claim.  
 
Mr. McWherter appealed the denial and the Appeals Board upheld this Court’s decision.  
Thereafter, Centurion moved for summary judgment citing the following material facts:
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1. Mr. McWherter alleged a tow motor weighing between seven and eight thousand 
pounds ran over his right foot while he worked at Centurion on March 25, 2015. 
2. Mr. McWherter received treatment from Concentra, which he chose from a panel. 
3. Concentra’s examination revealed some pain and mild swelling but no other 
apparent injury; x-rays were normal. 
4. Despite allegedly having been run over by a tow motor, Mr. McWherter slept in 
the exam room and lobby.  The medical provider determined he needed no further 
testing and no additional treatment. 
5. The attending physician diagnosed a minor injury but offered no treatment other 
than ibuprofen and a cold pack. 
6. After this initial visit with Centurion, providers placed him at maximum medical 
improvement, assigned no impairment and recommended no further care for his 
alleged work place injury. 
7. (Omitted.) 
8. Mr. McWherter returned to work for four weeks after March 25, 2015, and 
exhibited no signs of injury while doing his job.  Centurion terminated Mr. 
McWherter.   
9. After his termination, Mr. McWherter returned to Centurion on two occasions 
requesting that he be allowed to return to work. 
10. Mr. McWherter had a foot x-ray on May 11, 2015.  The results were normal. 
 
In its motion, Centurion argued Mr. McWherter cannot prove that he suffered an injury 
arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment at a compensation 
hearing.    
  
Legal Principles and Analysis 
  
 Motions for summary judgment are governed by Tennessee Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56.04, which provides for entry of summary judgment when “the pleadings, 
                                                 
1
 For brevity, the Court summarized the statements and omitted several not pertinent to its ruling on this motion.   
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Further, the Tennessee 
General Assembly codified the burden of proof in summary judgment motions as 
follows: 
 
In motions for summary judgment in any civil action in Tennessee, the 
moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial shall prevail on 
its motion for summary judgment if it: 
 
(1) Submits affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the 
nonmoving party’s claim; or 
 
(2) Demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving party’s evidence is 
insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s 
claim. 
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2016); Payne v. D and D Elec., 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. 
App. Bd. LEXIS 21, at *7-8 (May 4, 2016).  
 
 If the moving party meets its burden of negating an essential element or 
demonstrating evidence is insufficient, then the injured employee, as the nonmoving 
party, must “demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a 
rational trier of fact to find in [his or her] favor[.]”  Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of 
Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 265 (Tenn. 2015).  Thus, if Centurion meets its 
burden of proof, Mr. McWherter must do more than simply show some “metaphysical 
doubt” as to the material facts.  In other words, the Court must focus on any evidence Mr. 
McWherter presents at the summary judgment stage, “not on hypothetical evidence that 
theoretically could be adduced [by him] . . . at a future trial.”  Id.  The Court holds that 
Centurion met its burden of proving Mr. McWherter cannot establish an essential element 
of his case—the occurrence of an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and 
scope of his employment.  The Court further holds that Mr. McWherter failed to present 
evidence sufficient to support rebut this holding.   
 
Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, an “injury” means “an injury by accident 
. . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes death, 
disablement, or the need for medical treatment of the employee[.]”  To constitute a viable 
claim for workers’ compensation benefits the injury must be “by a specific incident, or 
set of incidents, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.”  
Further, “[a]n injury arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment 
only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment 
contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes[.]”  
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See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2016).  The material facts cited by Centurion show 
that Mr. McWherter did not suffer a workplace injury.   
 
In its statement of material facts, Centurion noted that Mr. McWherter claimed 
that a tow motor, a machine weighing between seven and eight thousand pounds, ran over 
his foot.  Despite this extremely heavy machine having run over his foot, Mr. McWherter 
showed no signs of distress while being transported for medical attention at Concentra 
and even fell asleep in the waiting room.  When Concentra providers examined Mr. 
McWherter, they found no signs of physical injury other than mild swelling of the right 
forefoot.  All x-rays were normal, and the medical staff determined Mr. McWherter 
needed no further treatment.  As the Court stated in its expedited hearing order denying 
benefits, “the Court finds it difficult to believe that a machine estimated to weigh more 
than seven thousand pounds caused only mild swelling upon running over Mr. 
McWherter’s foot.”  Based on these material facts, which are undisputed, the Court finds 
that Centurion carried its burden of negating an essential element of Mr. McWherter’s 
claim.  In this Court’s opinion, the facts show that Mr. McWherter did not suffer an 
injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment.  In order to 
avoid summary judgment, Mr. McWherter now must provide some evidence to rebut this 
finding. 
 
Mr. McWherter, however, failed to respond to Centurion’s motion.  In fact, the 
only evidence the Court has seen tending to prove that Mr. McWherter suffered an injury 
came from his own testimony at the expedited hearing.  For completeness, the Court 
refers to its original order cited above for its impression of Mr. McWherter’s testimony. 
Accordingly, the Court did not place any weight on his testimony from the expedited 
hearing and declines to give that testimony any weight in this motion hearing.   
 
Centurion complied with Rule 56’s requirements.  It also complied with this 
Court’s rule by providing a copy of Rule 56 to Mr. McWherter.  He failed to respond and 
failed to provide any evidence that he suffered an injury that arose primarily out of and in 
the course and scope of his employment.  As noted in Rye, “[t]he focus is on the evidence 
the nonmoving party comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on 
hypothetical evidence that theoretically could be adduced…at a future trial.” Id. at 265 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, the Court holds Mr. McWherter failed to “demonstrate the 
existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in 
[his] favor.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Court grants Centurion’s Motion.  
 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
 
1. Centurion’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
 
2. Mr. McWherter’s claim is dismissed with prejudice.  
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3. The Court assesses the $150 filing fee to Centurion pursuant to Tennessee 
Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.07 (2017), for which 
execution may issue as necessary. 
 
4. Absent an appeal of this order by either party, the order shall become final 
thirty days after its issuance.  
 
ENTERED ON THIS THE 28
TH
 DAY OF JULY, 2017. 
 
____________________________________ 
Judge Joshua Davis Baker 
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was sent to the 
following recipients by the following methods of service on this the ___ day of July, 
2017. 
 
Name Certified 
Mail 
Via 
Fax 
Via 
Email 
Addresses 
Jacquet 
McWherter  
  X 215 Tanglewood Ct. 
Nashville, TN  37211 
Fredjones182@gmail.com  
Stephen Morton, 
Attorney for 
Employer 
  X Stephen.morton@mgclaw.com 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________  
Penny Shrum, Clerk 
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov  
 
 
28th
